International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):369 – 392 (2003)
AbstractThis paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti-realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti-realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theory-independent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti-realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification-transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position - his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experience-transcendent reality with respect to appearances.
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Citations of this work
Kant on the Laws of Nature: Laws, Necessitation, and the Limitation of Our Knowledge.James Kreines - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):527-558.
Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’.Andrew Stephenson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (27):1-19.
Buddhist Idealists and Their Jain Critics On Our Knowledge of External Objects.Matthew T. Kapstein - 2014 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 74:123-147.
Does Kantian Mental Content Externalism Help Metaphysical Realists?Axel Mueller - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):449-473.