Logical pluralism and semantic information

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)

Authors
Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Abstract
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore
Keywords logical pluralism  semantic information  substructural logics
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-007-9054-2
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Geometries and Information in the Square of Oppositions.Hans5 Smessaert & Lorenz6 Demey - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4):527-565.
The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
Synonymy and Intra-Theoretical Pluralism.Patrick Allo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):77-91.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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