Logical pluralism and semantic information

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)
Abstract
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore
Keywords logical pluralism  semantic information  substructural logics
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-007-9054-2
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References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Basic Proof Theory.A. S. Troelstra - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
A Classical Prejudice?Patrick Allo - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.
A Classical Prejudice?Patrick Allo - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.

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