Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore
|Keywords||logical pluralism semantic information substructural logics|
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Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative?Patrick Allo & Edwin Mares - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):167-185.
The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
A Positive Information Logic for Inferential Information.Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):409 - 431.
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