Logical pluralism and semantic information

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694 (2007)
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Abstract

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore

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Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - London, England: Routledge.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.

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