Logic, Reasoning and Revision

Theoria 82 (1):3-31 (2015)
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Abstract

The traditional connection between logic and reasoning has been under pressure ever since Gilbert Harman attacked the received view that logic yields norms for what we should believe. In this article I first place Harman's challenge in the broader context of the dialectic between logical revisionists like Bob Meyer and sceptics about the role of logic in reasoning like Harman. I then develop a formal model based on contemporary epistemic and doxastic logic in which the relation between logic and norms for belief can be captured

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Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Citations of this work

Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.
Hard and Soft Logical Information.Allo Patrick - 2017 - Journal of Logic and Computation:1-20.

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References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.

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