Abstract

My analysis of the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been criticized by Paul Craig; but his objections confuse the ‘constructive’ account of legislative intent I defend with the ‘literal’ conception (reflecting the views of individual legislators) I expressly repudiate. He thinks we must choose between legislative intent, literally conceived, and common law principle. This mistake exemplifies the peculiar character of Craig's ‘common law model’ of judicial review, in which the requirements of the rule of law, on one hand, and the relevant statute, on the other, exist in separate mental worlds. That model is conceptually confused, rejecting the doctrine of ultra vires that (unqualified) legislative supremacy entails, and ultimately grounded in a wholly implausible view of the relationship between common law and statute. It subordinates both statutory text and purpose to common law doctrine, treated as largely self-contained and impervious to context. It ignores the interdependence of legislative and judicial power, impeding a genuine integration of statutory command and common law principle