British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4):537-553 (1992)
Daniel Dennett and Stephen Stich have independently, but similarly, argued that the contents of mental states cannot be specified precisely enough for the purposes of scientific prediction and explanation. Dennett takes this to support his view that the proper role for mentalistic terms in science is heuristic. Stich takes it to support his view that cognitive science should be done without reference to mental content at all. I defend a realist understanding of mental content against these attacks by Dennett and Stich. I argue that they both mistake the difficulty of making content ascriptions precise for the impossibility of doing so
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.
Intentionality, Social Play, and Definition.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74.
Cognitive Ethology and the Intentionality of Animal Behavior.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328.
Similar books and articles
Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
Something Mental is Just in the Head, and What the Mental Out of the Head is Like.Arvan Marcus - manuscript
Content: Covariation, Control, and Contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content.Andrew E. Newman - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #114,173 of 2,158,398 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #87,143 of 2,158,398 )
How can I increase my downloads?