Mental content

Abstract
Daniel Dennett and Stephen Stich have independently, but similarly, argued that the contents of mental states cannot be specified precisely enough for the purposes of scientific prediction and explanation. Dennett takes this to support his view that the proper role for mentalistic terms in science is heuristic. Stich takes it to support his view that cognitive science should be done without reference to mental content at all. I defend a realist understanding of mental content against these attacks by Dennett and Stich. I argue that they both mistake the difficulty of making content ascriptions precise for the impossibility of doing so
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/43.4.537
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,692
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?Jacob Beck - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.
Mental Content and Evolutionary Explanation.Colin Allen - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
Intentionality, Social Play, and Definition.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

45 ( #114,173 of 2,158,398 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #87,143 of 2,158,398 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums