What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret
quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to
be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the
wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally
all there is in the world. Erwin Schroedinger was one of the first proponents of such a view, but he dismissed it after he realized it led to macroscopic superpositions (if the wave function evolves in time according to the equations that has his name). The Many-Worlds interpretation1 accepts the existence of such macroscopic superpositions but takes it that they can never be observed. Superposed objects and superposed observers split together in different worlds of the type of the one we appear to live in. For these who, like Schroedinger, think that macroscopic superpositions are a problem, the common wisdom is that there are two alternative views: "Either the wave function, as given by the Schroedinger equation, is not everything, or is not right" [Bell 1987]. The deBroglie-Bohm theory, now commonly known as Bohmian Mechanics, takes the first option: the description provided by a
Schroedinger-evolving wave function is supplemented by the information provided by the configuration of the particles. The second possibility consists in assuming that, while the wave function provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is not given by the Schroedinger equation.
Rather, the usual Schroedinger evolution is interrupted by random and sudden "collapses". The most promising theory of this kind is the GRW theory, named after the scientists that developed it: Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber..
It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can take the wave function
ontologically seriously and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions
just allowing for quantum jumps. In this paper we will argue that such "bare" wave function ontology is not possible, neither for GRW nor for any other quantum theory: quantum mechanics cannot be about the wave function
simpliciter. That is, we need more structure than the one provided by the
wave function. As a response, quantum theories about the wave function can
be supplemented with structure, without taking it as an additional ontology.
We argue in reply that such "dressed-up" versions of wave function ontology
are not sensible, since they compromise the acceptability of the theory as a satisfactory fundamental physical theory. Therefore we maintain that:
1- Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as
theories about the wave function;
2- Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological
structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously.
Moreover, we will argue that any of the traditional responses to the
measurement problem of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics, GRW
and Many-Worlds), contrarily to what commonly believed, share a common
structure. That is, we maintain that:
3- All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical
objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology
is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity
in three-dimensional space, or space-time.