Authors
Robert Allen
Wayne State University (PhD)
Abstract
The representationist maintains that an experience represents a state of affairs. To elaborate, a stimulus of one’s sensorium produces, according to her, a “phenomenal composite” made up of “phenomenal properties” that are the typical effects of certain mind-independent features of the world, which are thereby represented. It is such features, via their phenomenal representatives, of which the subject of an experience would become aware were she to engage in introspection. So, one might ask, what state of affairs would be represented by an illusory experience, that is, one to which no state of affairs in the vicinity of its subject corresponds? The answer, according to the standard defense of representationism (SD), is the same state of affairs that would obtain in its subject’s surroundings if it were veridical.
Keywords Frege  Representation  Illusion  Meaning  Mind-independence  Phenomena  Language  State of Affairs
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