Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Dialectica 65 (2):153-176 (2011)

Authors
Keith Allen
University of York
Abstract
According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections
Keywords Colour  Primitivism  Naive Realism  Revelation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

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Citations of this work BETA

Folk Core Beliefs About Color.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
How to Tell Essence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):147-168.
Why Colour Primitivism?Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.

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