Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Metaphysica 19 (1):137-155 (2018)
Authors
Sean Allen-Hermanson
Florida International University
Abstract
I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in "split second." Meanwhile, Bourget's empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism
Keywords underived intentionality  consciousness  temporal structure  Moore's method of isolation  specious present  phenomenal atomism  unity of consciousness  David Bourget
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DOI 10.1515/mp-2018-0007
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
Modularity of Mind.Philip Robbins - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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