The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting

Res Publica 18 (3):207-223 (2012)
I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point
Keywords Epistemic democracy  Majority voting  Lottery voting  Accuracy  Decision procedure
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11158-011-9176-9
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,798
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Columbia University Press.
Law and Disagreement.Jeremy Waldron - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

41 ( #127,858 of 2,178,017 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #39,594 of 2,178,017 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums