The Epistemology of Non-distributive Profiles

Philosophy and Technology 33 (3):379-409 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The distinction between distributive and non-distributive profiles figures prominently in current evaluations of the ethical and epistemological risks that are associated with automated profiling practices. The diagnosis that non-distributive profiles may coincidentally situate an individual in the wrong category is often perceived as the central shortcoming of such profiles. According to this diagnosis, most risks can be retraced to the use of non-universal generalisations and various other statistical associations. This article develops a top-down analysis of non-distributive profiles in which this fallibility of non-distributive profiles is no longer central. Instead, it focuses on how profiling creates various asymmetries between an individual data-subject and a profiler. The emergence of informational, interest, and perspectival asymmetries between data-subject and profiler explains how non-distributive profiles weaken the epistemic position of a profiled individual. This alternative analysis provides a more balanced assessment of the epistemic risks associated with non-distributive profiles.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,748

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Distributive Epistemic Justice in Science.Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (2):325–345.
Fairness to non-participants: a case for a practice-independent egalitarian baseline.Merten Reglitz - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (4): 466-485.
Do We Have Relational Reasons to Care About Intergenerational Equality?Caleb Althorpe & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns - 2025 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-18

Downloads
29 (#839,596)

6 months
4 (#970,122)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel