Philosophical Studies 153 (3):417-434 (2011)
The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.
|Keywords||Epistemic logic Information Knowledge|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Philosophy of Information: Ten Years Later.Luciano Floridi - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):402-419.
Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
Offline and Online Data: On Upgrading Functional Information to Knowledge.Giuseppe Primiero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):371-392.
You Better Play 7: Mutual Versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment.Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni & Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1351-1381.
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