Erkenntnis:1-6 (forthcoming)

Authors
Jan Almäng
University of Karlstad
Abstract
David Chalmers has recently argued that Relativity Theory supports the notion that shapes are Twin-Earthable. In this paper this argument is challenged. I reconstruct the argument in five steps where the last step is the conclusion. I proceed to argue that one step in the argument can be interpreted in two different ways. The problem is that on the first interpretation of the step, the conclusion does not follow. And on the second interpretation of the step, it contradicts a previous step in the argument. I conclude that Relativity Theory does not entail that phenomenal and functional twins could represent different shapes.
Keywords Perception  Shape  Chalmers  Twin Earth  Externalism  Relativity Theory
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00270-z
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