Authors
David Alm
Lund University
Abstract
Two generally recognized moral duties are to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. In this paper I want to show that it is not possible to give an adequate account of either duty – or at least one that corresponds to our actual practices – within a contractualist moral theory of the type developed by T. M. Scanlon (1982, 1998). This fact is interesting in its own right, as contractualism is a leading contemporary contender among deontological moral theories, and the two duties I have mentioned are fairly standard ingredients of such theories. But it also serves to highlight a general problem with contractualism, at least in Scanlon’s version – namely its one-dimensional view of the keystone of any plausible deontological theory: the idea of respect for persons.
Keywords Scanlon  contractualism  moral duties
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Reprint years 2008
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v2i3.25
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1651 - Harmondsworth, Penguin.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1871 - Thoemmes Press.

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