Mind (forthcoming)

Authors
Mahrad Almotahari
University of Edinburgh
Aidan Gray
University of Illinois, Chicago
Abstract
We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege’s Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional-attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzaa078
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.

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