Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):549 - 574 (2008)

Joseph Almog
University of Turku
The first page of Frege’s classic “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung” sets for more than a hundred years now the agenda for much of semantics and the philosophy of mind. It presents a purported puzzle whose solution is said to call upon the “entities” of semantics (meanings) and psychological explanation (Psychological states, beliefs, concepts). The paper separates three separate alleged puzzles that can be read into Frege’s data. It then argues that none are genuine puzzles. In turn, much of the Frege-driven theoretical development, motivated as an inevitable “solution”, is thrown into doubt.
Keywords frege  semantics  cognitive state  sense  direct reference  information
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-008-9080-8
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In What Sense is Frege's (Statement of the) Puzzle "Problematic"?Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53 (136):51-57.

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