Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103):163-165 (1976)
This paper is a reply to hoffman's piece "almeder on truth and evidence" ("philosophical quarterly", Volume 25, January 1975). In "truth and evidence" ("philosophical quarterly", Volume 24, October 1974) I had argued that gettier-Type counterexamples to the classical definition of knowledge as completely justified true belief are defective because they assume the false proposition that a person can be completely justified in believing a false proposition. Hoffman objected to my reasons for saying as much and in this paper I reply to his objections
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