Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23 (2014)
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Abstract |
It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive significance. So the veridicality of a certain perceptual experience, can imply the truth of certain propositions. Consequently, perceptions can have non-propositional content, but even so justify perceptual judgments which have a propositional structure.
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Keywords | perceptual content propositional structure perceptual judgments perceptual justification perceptual structure |
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DOI | 10.1515/mp-2014-0001 |
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Citations of this work BETA
The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification.Arnaud Dewalque - 2015 - In Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Normativity in Perception. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 178-195.
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