Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 42 (2):197 - 218 (2010)

In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the latest thesis of Charles Travis and that will permit us to conclude with a semantic definition of truth for natural languages
Keywords Conocimiento  Contextualism  Contextualismo  Condiciones de verdad  Illocutionary force  Knowledge  John L Austin  Truth-conditions  Fuerza ilocucionaria
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,513
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention and Convention in Speech Acts.P. F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.
Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1948 - Analysis 9 (6):83-97.
Studies in the Way of Words.Robert J. Fogelin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):213-219.
Meaning’s Role in Truth.Charles Travis - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):451-466.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
57 ( #185,686 of 2,446,483 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #310,206 of 2,446,483 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes