Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516 (2003)
AbstractSceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil
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Citations of this work
We are not in the Dark: Refuting Popular Arguments Against Skeptical Theism.Perry Hendricks - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):125-134.
In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241.
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The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of “appearance”.Stephen Wykstra - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):73 - 93.
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Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
The inductive argument from evil and the human cognitive condition.William P. Alston - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:29-67.