Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516 (2003)
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Abstract

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil

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Author Profiles

Graham Oppy
Monash University
Mike Almeida
University of Texas at San Antonio

References found in this work

The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William L. Rowe - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.
19 The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William Rowe - 1999 - In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 6--157.

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