Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516 (2003)
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Abstract

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil

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Author Profiles

Graham Oppy
Monash University
Mike Almeida
University of Texas at San Antonio

Citations of this work

Skeptical theism.Justin McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241.
The problem of evil: skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis.Scott Sehon - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):67 - 80.
Recent Work on the Problem of Evil.T. Dougherty - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):560-573.

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