The Impossibility of Moral Conflicts
Dissertation, The Ohio State University (
1988)
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Abstract
Historically, moral philosophers have been highly critical of moral theories which generate moral conflicts. Aside from the fact that such theories are inadequate practical guides, it has been argued, they are flawed in a more fundamental, logical sense. However, until recently, the logical problem attributed to moral theories which generate moral conflicts has not been clearly formulated. In the recent literature it has been argued that the logical problem admits of clear and precise formulation in terms of standard deontic logic. The axioms of standard deontic logic, which provide the basis of normative reasoning in general, preclude even the logical possibility of moral conflicts. It follows that any moral theory which generates moral conflicts is logically inconsistent. ;The dissertation is divided into three parts. In the first part of the dissertation it is shown that the axioms of standard deontic logic do not preclude the possibility of any interesting type of moral conflict. This is particularly important for those who maintain that moral conflicts are not possible, since it follows that their position is independent of the highly controversial standard deontic axioms. In the second part it is shown that the axioms of classical deontic logic do preclude the possibility of interesting types of moral conflicts, and it is argued that the classical axioms are much more plausible candidates for logical truths than the standard axioms. In the final part of the dissertation it is shown that none of the traditional paradoxes associated with the axioms of standard deontic logic afflict the classical axioms. It is concluded that once the problem of moral conflicts is formulated in classical deontic logic the presumption is clearly in favor of the claim that moral conflicts are logically impossible