Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439 (2012)

Jan Almäng
University of Karlstad
Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three desiderata for a theory of time-consciousness are subsequently introduced. It is then argued that a theory locating time-consciousness as a feature of psychological mode will fail to satisfy these desiderata. In the last section the intentionality of memories is discussed. Using the notion of shiftable indexical, it is argued that memories have the same explicit content as perceptions, but that they nevertheless can have different conditions of satisfaction since they are entertained in different modes
Keywords Time  Content  Perception  Memory  Psychological mode  Recanati
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0134-0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,554
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.François Recanati - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
A Plea for Monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Andrew Woodfield - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):300-303.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Tense as a Feature of Perceptual Content.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):361-378.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Duplicating Thoughts.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):92-102.
Image Content.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 265-290.
Content, Mode, and Self-Reference.François Recanati - 2006 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-63.
The Twofold Orientational Structure of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):187-203.
Memory and Time.Jordi Fernandez - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
Biological Functions and Perceptual Content.Mohan Matthen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent Muller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.


Added to PP index

Total views
157 ( #55,587 of 2,331,146 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #99,006 of 2,331,146 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes