Oxford University Press (2001)
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Abstract |
In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop into Descartes's main philosophical preoccupation: the Mind-Body distinction. How can Mind and Body be independent entities, yet joined--essentially so--within a single human being? If Mind and Body are really distinct, are human beings merely a "construction"? On the other hand, if we respect the integrity of humans, are Mind and Body merely aspects of a human being and not subjects in and of themselves? For centuries, philosophers have considered this classic philosophical puzzle. Now, in this compact, engaging, and long-awaited work UCLA philosopher Joseph Almog closely decodes the French philosopher's argument for distinguishing between the human mind and body while maintaining simultaneously their essential integration in a human being. He argues that Descartes constructed a solution whereby the trio of Human Mind, Body, and Being are essentially interdependent yet remain each a genuine individual subject. Almog's reading not only steers away from the most popular interpretations of Descartes, but also represents a scholar coming to grips directly with Descartes himself. In doing so, Almog creates a work that Cartesian scholars will value, and that will also prove indispensable to philosophers of language, ontology, and the metaphysics of mind.
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Keywords | Dilemma Dualism Man Metaphysics Mind-body Descartes |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2005 |
Buy this book | Amazon page |
Call number | B1878.M55.A46 2002 |
ISBN(s) | 9780195177190 0195177193 0195146468 9780195146462 |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00424.x |
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The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Thoughts on the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness.Stan Klein - 2021 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 8 (74-80).
Descartes's Theory of Substance: Why He Was Not a Trialist.Eugenio E. Zaldivar - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):395 - 418.
Spinoza’s Substance Monism.Yakir Levin - 2012 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 15 (1):368-386.
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