Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302 (2016)

Authors
Facundo M. Alonso
Miami University, Ohio
Abstract
In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals –including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations.
Keywords Shared intention  Psychological and normative aspects  Psychological roles  Interpersonal obligations  Reliance  Intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
Collective and Joint Intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Communication and Shared Information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
On the Duties of Shared Parenting.Philip Cook - 2012 - Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (2):168-181.
Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
'Shared Agency', Gilbert, and Deep Continuity.Thomas H. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):49-57.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-11

Total views
273 ( #28,100 of 2,348,315 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #13,697 of 2,348,315 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes