A proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic

Archive for Mathematical Logic 52 (7-8):759-778 (2013)
A sequent root-first proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic is presented. The procedure is obtained from modified intuitionistic multi-succedent and classical sequent calculi, making use of Glivenko’s Theorem. We prove that a sequent is derivable in a standard intuitionistic multi-succedent calculus if and only if the corresponding prefixed-sequent is derivable in the procedure.
Keywords Propositional intuitionistic logic  Sequent calculus  Glivenko’s Theorem
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DOI 10.1007/s00153-013-0342-y
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Structural Proof Theory.Sara Negri, Jan von Plato & Aarne Ranta - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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