Intending, Settling, and Relying

In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74 (2017)
Authors
Facundo M. Alonso
Miami University, Ohio
Abstract
Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as settling. This paper proposes an alternative conception of such a constraint. The idea is to conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. The aim of the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action, to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint, and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act.
Keywords intention  settling an issue  control  belief  reliance  doxastic accounts of intention  conative accounts of intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Settling.Robert E. Goodin - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
Agential Settling Requires a Conscious Intention.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (01):139-155.
Intending.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.
A Causal Theory of Intending.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
What Are Conditional Intentions?Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):30-60.
Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
A Causal Theory of Intending.Robert K. Shope - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:361-394.
The Intentional and the Intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
How Do You Know That You Settled a Question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
Ludwig on Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):61-74.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-25

Total downloads
90 ( #69,011 of 2,268,153 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #21,666 of 2,268,153 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature