Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265 (2020)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive aspect to intention-based coordination, but that such an aspect is better understood in terms of the attitude of reliance than of belief. I also argue that an appeal to reliance affords Conativists with useful resources for explaining that aspect of intention-based coordination in a way that is compatible with their rejection of the aforementioned thesis.
|
Keywords | intention planning coordination reliance belief doxasticism and conativism about intention |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2020 |
DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.850 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Deciding to Believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
View all 34 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.
The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.
A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
Intention, Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers.Tobias Schröder, Terrence C. Stewart & Paul Thagard - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880.
Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations.Facundo M. Alonso - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
How the Brain Understands Intention: Different Neural Circuits Identify the Componential Features of Motor and Prior Intentions.Cristina Becchio, Mauro Adenzato & Bruno G. Bara - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):64-74.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-11-19
Total views
82 ( #143,137 of 2,519,441 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,569 of 2,519,441 )
2019-11-19
Total views
82 ( #143,137 of 2,519,441 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,569 of 2,519,441 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads