Externalist theories of perception

Abstract
The title refers to theories that require a certain sort of relation between X and an experience of S in order that S perceive X. The relation might be causal, counterfactual, doxastic, or otherwise. It is argued against such theories that there are possible cases in which X stands in the required relation to an experience of S and S does not perceive X and cases in which X is perceived though it does not stand in the required relation
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DOI 10.2307/2108033
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Perception and Representation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
In Defense of Relational Direct Realism.Kenneth Hobson - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
Sensory Experience and Intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.

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