The NOAer’s Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Faced with interminable combat over some piece of philosophical terrain, someone will inevitably suggest that the contested ground is nothing more than a philosophically manufactured mirage that is therefore not worth fighting for. Arthur Fine has long advocated such a response—the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude,’ or NOA—to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding the prima facie incompatibility between the realist’s and anti-realist’s positions, Fine suggests that there is in fact enough common ground for NOA to stand on its own as a minimal alternative, one that enjoys the advantage of being free of the philosophical burdens of its overweight contenders.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Constructive empiricism and the vices of voluntarism.Paul Dicken - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.
How natural can ontology be?Sharon L. Crasnow - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.


Added to PP

200 (#96,635)

6 months
5 (#629,136)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marc Alspector-Kelly
Western Michigan University

Citations of this work

Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):175-205.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin (ed.) - 1984 - University of California Press.
Science without numbers, A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry Field - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 171 (4):502-503.
Piecemeal realism.Arthur Fine - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):79 - 96.
Noa's ark--fine for realism.Alan Musgrave - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):383-398.
Scientific Realism.John Worrall - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):370-376.

View all 7 references / Add more references