American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41 (1971)
This paper distinguishes and interrelates a number of respects in which persons have been thought to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-A-Vis their own mental states. The most important distinction is a six-Fold one between infallibility, Omniscience, Indubitability, Incorrigibility, Truth-Sufficiency, And self-Warrant. Each of these varieties can then be sub-Divided as the kind of modality, If any, Involved. It is also argued that discussions of self-Knowledge have been hampered by a failure to recognize these distinctions
|Keywords||Corrigibility Disposition Epistemology Knowledge Metaphysics Mind Sensation Armstrong, D Aune, B|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game.Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3):415-444.
Similar books and articles
Perception and Corrigibility.Bruce N. Langtry - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (December):369-372.
Vesey on Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
Tormey on Access and Incorrigibility.Fred Feldman & Herbert Heidelberger - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (May):297-298.
Professor Armstrong on 'Non-Physical Sensory Items'.Howard M. Robinson - 1972 - Mind 81 (January):84-86.
Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind.Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.) - 2009 - de Gruyter.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads144 ( #32,256 of 2,158,467 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #23,185 of 2,158,467 )
How can I increase my downloads?