Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem

Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366 (2012)
Abstract
According to the bootstrapping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one’s knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one’s belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by denying basic knowledge succumb to over-intellectualizing epistemology, and secondly, reliabilist views avoid over-intellectualization only at the expense of sanctioning bootstrapping as a benign procedure. Both of these outcomes are difficult to bear. To ward off each of these unsavory outcomes, I propose an alternative solution that draws on a distinction between two separate epistemic concepts: entitlement and justification.
Keywords Reliabilism  Justification  Entitlement  Bootstrapping  Over-intellectualization  Perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0136-y
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
Burge on Perceptual Entitlement.Hamid Vahid - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.
What is Entitlement?Albert Casullo - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
Toward a Defensible Bootstrapping.Sam Mitchell - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):241-260.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva Jr - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-06

Total downloads

337 ( #8,357 of 2,164,635 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #19,538 of 2,164,635 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums