Know-how, ability, and the ability hypothesis

Theoria 67 (3):229-39 (2001)
Authors
Torin Alter
University of Alabama
Abstract
David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . Does it?
Keywords Ability  Experience  Hypothesis  Knowing How  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Chomsky, N  Lewis, D  Nemirow, L
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2001.tb00205.x
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing-How and Knowing-That.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Knowledge of Artefact Functions.Wybo Houkes - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):102-113.
Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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