Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument

Mind 122 (486):fzt072 (2013)
Abstract
According to social externalism, it is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one’s intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one’s linguistic community. Derek Ball (2009) argues, in effect, that (i) social externalism extends to our concepts of colour experience and (ii) this fact undermines both the knowledge argument against physicalism and the most popular physicalist response to it, known as the phenomenal concept strategy. I argue that Ball is mistaken about (ii) even granting (i). The knowledge argument and the phenomenal concept strategy might have to be modified to make them consistent with social externalism, but not in fundamental or detrimental ways
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt072
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References found in this work BETA
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.

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Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery.Derek Ball - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt075.
Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.

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