Authors
Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves
Federal University Of Sao Joao Del-Rei (UFSJ), Brazil
Abstract
Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism is then extended to his sentimentalist theory, that accounts for how emotions are integrated into moral judgments. The central problem is that Prinz’s view fails to capture the rational aspect of moral evaluation. I make this failure explicit and defend that some version or other of neosentimentalism is a more promising route.
Keywords Jesse Prinz  emotion  emotionism  sentimentalism  neosentimentalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5007/1677-2954.2013v12n1p113
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
Moral Emotions.Ronald de Sousa - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
Moral Emotions.Ronald de Sousa - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109 - 126.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-10-29

Total views
786 ( #7,789 of 2,454,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #16,475 of 2,454,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes