Fregean de re thoughts

Cognitio-Estudos 11 (1):1-12 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian considerations that contaminated the interpretation of Frege. This contaminated understanding is first detected in Tyler Burge’s distinction between de dicto and de re, then connected to the motivations behind David Kaplan’s notion of character, and finally found in John Searle’s descriptivist account. The difficulty in understanding de re thoughts is, roughly speaking, a side effect of the misunderstanding of the boundaries separating internal and external elements of thoughts, as well as the distinction between mental content and means of representation.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Frege and Object Dependent Propositions.Heimir Geirsson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):299–314.
Frege on Indexicals: Sense and Context Sensitivity.Richard Charles Devidi - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Toward a New Theory of Fregean Sense.Jungshin Suh Rhee - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
The Ontology of Meanings. [REVIEW]Mark Siebel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):417 - 426.
Frege Et le Cogito.StÉphane Chauvier - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):349-368.
The Structure of Frege's Thoughts.Marian Zouhar - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209.
Meaning, Expression, and Thought.Wayne A. Davis - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):417-426.
A Repair of Frege’s Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions.João Branquinho - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:17-27.
McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth.Julian Dodd - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):160 - 165.
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-08

Downloads
150 (#82,625)

6 months
20 (#50,340)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references