Manuscrito 41 (1):67-91 (2018)

The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware of the sketchy and schematic way in which my proposal is advanced and the other alternatives are criticized, I hope this paper is still worth its ink at least insofar as it is capable of pointing to a novel and promising way out of old and resilient difficulties that have been haunting philosophers of perception. If not a fully developed theory, at least I deliver here a sketch that, or so I sell, is worth the bet.
Keywords perceptual content  phenomenal singularity  ontological singularity  representationalism  naïve realism
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DOI 10.1590/
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

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