the Backdoor and other Stories

           Much has been written of late concerning the relative virtues and vices of correspondence and deflationary theories of Truth. One might go so far as to say the issue is currently “hotâ€. What is troubling, however, is that it is not always entirely clear exactly what distinguishes the different conceptions of truth. Characterizations of the distinction are often vague and sometimes vary from writer to writer. Let me give a few examples:            ‘The basic idea for deflationary theories of truth is ... roughly that there is no more..
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