Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Kenneth Dorter. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: The "'Parmenides," "Theaetetus," "Sophist," and "Statesman." Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994. Pp. x + 256. Cloth, $45.00. Dorter's title suggests an engagement with Eieaticism, and, certainly in three of" the dialogues, Parmenides was much on Plato's mind. In a book otherwise sensitive to implications of dramatic setting for the argument, little is said of Eleaticism. If the "Eleatic" in the title was selected instead of "critical" for purposes of neutrality (x), "form" and "good" are more revealing of Dorter's approach. The introduction gives a rendering of revisionist and unitarian arguments about the late dialogues, pondering the effects of interpretive style, while Dotter attempts to retain some element of interpretive neutrality without disguising his own preference for finding a reaffirmation, not a critical rejection of the forms. About the forms Dorter would extract two fundamental claims, conspicuous throughout his commentary: forms are "universals, instances of 'sameness' in reality" and "values, articulations of the goodness of reality" (l 5)Keeping these two points in view, Dorter sees all four dialogues united by the method of hypothesis as outlined in the Phaedo, supplemented in the latter two by the more rigorous method of division. Dorter follows the analytic interpretive tradition in taking the Parmenides to raise serious criticisms against the theory of forms; all criticisms have, however, rejoinders anticipated in the middle dialogues. It seems Socrates, being but a boy at the time, is too young to formulate responses to the attack, if not too young to fully and accurately articulate the theory under attack. The generation of contradiction upon contradiction out of the hypotheses about the one illustrates negatively that the unity of form, in particular the form of the good, is indispensible. Forms are recovered in a hypothetical exposition carried on throughout the subsequent three dialogues, each representing a hypothesis that responds one step more adequately than the previous dialogue in the series, each dialogue itself comprising a progression of hypotheses. The Theaetetus argues by reductio for the forms. While the theory of universal flux allows that all things are produced by mixture, a process of"parentage" (75ff.), knowledge is missing one parent, the forms, which are not admitted in the dialogue. Nevertheless, each failed account of knowledge comes closer to the truth, the most promising account being the definition of knowledge as true opinion with an account, where the account is an analysis into parts. This fails in Dorter's view because, in assuming the whole to be nothing other than the parts, it does not say how parts can be intelligible apart from a prior whole. A reader might find it as hard to say how this is a hypotheti- [679] 680 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 cal advance over the criticisms of the Parmenidesas to say how the Theaetetusshould be called an "Eleatic" dialogue. The Sophist then reintroduces form, but in its epistemological aspect alone. Extensive use is made of the method of division, presented in the commentary as a rigorous method for precise definition, yet the Sophistfails to distinguish sophistry from philosophy. Two reasons are given. The final division locates sophistry under the productive, rather than the acquisitive arts. (The commentary indicates no surprise at sophistry being categorized as an art at all.) Moreover, the method of division makes no use of value, the real distinguishing feature of the two types of art, although Dorter argues that allusion is made to value through references to the Republic'stheory of soul. The Statesman fills in the missing feature by introducing measurement against the standard of the mean as opposed to relative measurement, finally reintegrating both features that Dorter considers salient aspects of Platonic forms: universality (sameness) from the Sophistand now value (the mean) in the Statesman. The commentary finds that the use of division in the Statesman, where it is not strictly dichotomous, evidences a "decline from the rigor and precision of the divisions in the Sophist"(l 8 l), despite the rejection of division by strict halving in the Phaedrusand in Aristotle. Lack of rigor is not, however, a reproach in Dorter's...