Fearing Death

Philosophy 58 (224):175 - 188 (1983)
Abstract
Many have said, and I think some have shown, that it is irrational to fear death. The extinction of what is essential to the self—whether it be biological death or the permanent cessation of consciousness—cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or as a harm
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100068674
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Citations of this work BETA
Recalcitrant Fears of Death.Hine Kristen - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):454-466.
Anticipating Annihilation.Mikel Burley - 2006 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):170 – 185.
The Varieties of Fear.Wayne A. Davis - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.

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