Acquiring a Concept of Visual Experience

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):223-245 (2020)

Austin Andrews
Washington University in St. Louis
The transparency of visual experience is a widely held and important thesis in the philosophy of perception. Critical discussion of transparency has focused on visual experiences, such as the experience of visual blur that are taken to be counter examples to transparency. Here, I consider a novel objection to transparency that does not depend on intuitions about examples. The objection is that if transparency is true then we cannot explain our ability to think about our visual experiences as such. In response to this objection, I develop an account of how we are able to think about our own visual experiences as such that is compatible with transparency.
Keywords Visual experience  Transparency  Concept acquisition
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz065
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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