Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108 (2003)
It has been argued - most prominently in Harry Frankfurt's recent work - that the normative authority of personal commitments derives not from their intrinsic worth but from the way in which one's will is invested in what one cares about. In this essay, I argue that even if this approach is construed broadly and supplemented in various ways, its intrasubjective character leaves it ill-prepared to explain the normative grip of commitments in cases of purported self-betrayal. As an alternative, I sketch a view that focuses on intersubjective constraints of intelligibility built into social practices and on the pragmatics of how those norms are contested in an ongoing fashion
|Keywords||Autonomy Normativity Charles Taylor Harry Frankfurt Second-order desires Self-interpretation|
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References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.Charles Taylor - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Oppression, Autonomy and the Impossibility of the Inner Citadel.Peter Nelsen - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (4):333-349.
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