A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux

Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):183-195 (2017)
Abstract
Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.
Keywords evidence  defence of intuitions  metaphilosophy  philosophical methodology  epistemology of philosophy  descriptive evidentialism  intuitions
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12225
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