A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision

Holger Andreas
University Of British Columbia, Okanagan
The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, a substantial simplification of the ranking information that is necessary to define revisions and contractions uniquely is achieved. This system is, furthermore, expressive enough to capture complex and non-trivial scientific examples. It is thus closely related to a novel research area within belief revision theory which addresses the dynamics of scientific knowledge
Keywords Abduction  Belief bases  Belief revision  Default logic  Defeasible reasoning  Epistemic ranking  Structuralist theory of science
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DOI 10.1007/s10849-010-9128-3
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Explanation and Scientific Understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.
Patterns of Abduction.G. Schurz - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):201-234.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hypothetical Interventions and Belief Changes.Holger Andreas & Lorenzo Casini - 2019 - Foundations of Science 24 (4):681-704.

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