Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):125-154 (2006)
b>. Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism
|Keywords||Action Knowledge Proprioception Realism Science Vision|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Problem with Brain GUTs: Conflation of Different Senses of “Prediction” Threatens Metaphysical Disaster.Michael L. Anderson & Tony Chemero - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):204-205.
What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism.Karim Zahidi - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
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