Social Epistemology 26 (2):163-173 (2012)

Authors
Elizabeth Anderson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker?s focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
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References found in this work BETA

The Epistemology of Democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):8-22.

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Citations of this work BETA

Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.

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