Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable

Dialectica 69 (2):205-220 (2015)
Authors
James Andow
University of East Anglia
Abstract
Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.
Keywords Expertise Defence  Intuitions  Philosophical Methodology  Experimental Philosophy  Moral Intuitions  Moral philosophy
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12092
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References found in this work BETA

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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Citations of this work BETA

Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.

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