Philosophical Papers 37 (1):89-129 (2008)
I defend a neo-Kantian view wherein we are capable of being completely autonomous and impartial and argue that this ability can ground normativity. As this view includes an existentialist conception of the self, I defend radical choice, a primary component of that conception, against arguments many take to be definitive. I call the ability to use radical choice “existentialist voluntarism” and bring it into a current debate in normative philosophy, arguing that it allows that we can be distanced from all ends at once so as to be completely impartial. Finally, I indicate how this can be the source of normativity as it provides a purely impartial reason for being rational
|Keywords||autonomy existentialism voluntarism grounding normativity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons.Ken O'Day - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
Voluntarism and Conventionalism in Hobbes and Kant.Larry Krasnoff - 2012 - Hobbes Studies 25 (1):43-65.
The Philosophy of Normativity, or How to Try Clearing Things Up a Little.Christine Tappolet & Alan Voizard - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (02):233-238.
Empiricism, Stances, and the Problem of Voluntarism.Peter Baumann - 2010 - Synthese 178 (1):27-36.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads66 ( #77,451 of 2,154,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #162,555 of 2,154,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?