Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):1-14 (2019)

Authors
Giacomo Andreoletti
School of Advanced Studies, University of Tyumen
Abstract
In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar in spirit and intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery.
Keywords fatalism  future contingents  bivalence  third truth value view  all false view
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phib.12157
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Past, Present and Future.Arthur Prior - 1967 - Clarendon Press.
Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing Future Contingents.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):43-50.
Fatalism.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
Introduction.Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer - 2015 - In John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 01-38.
In Defence of Ockhamism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.
Sea Battle Semantics.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):326–335.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-09-22

Total views
308 ( #27,944 of 2,432,375 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
60 ( #12,340 of 2,432,375 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes