Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606 (2014)
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| Abstract |
It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals
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| Keywords | Epistemic modals Fallibilism Concessive knowledge attributions Epistemic possibility |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-013-0115-9 |
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.
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Citations of this work BETA
On the Intimate Relationship of Knowledge and Action.Charity Anderson - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):343-353.
Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
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Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.
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