Incommensurable alternatives and rational choice

Ratio 18 (3):249–261 (2005)
I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces
Keywords completeness  incommensurable alternatives  practical reason  rational choice
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00288.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,167
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Value in Ethics and Economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
Reasonably Vicious.Candace A. Vogler - 2002 - Harvard University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

87 ( #57,966 of 2,152,648 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #162,806 of 2,152,648 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums