Ratio 18 (3):249–261 (2005)
I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reﬂection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces
|Keywords||completeness incommensurable alternatives practical reason rational choice|
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.
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